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 Despite a multiplicity of judicial decisions throughout the 
country, the line between religious and secular influence in education 
has remained cloudy since the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the 
issue.1 Perhaps because “[t]he task of separating the secular from the 
religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy, and delicacy,”2 
the courts have been cautious to draw hard lines on the government’s 
interaction with religious institutions.3 In recent years, the ambiguity 
created by overlapping analysis has stretched to religious use of school 
facilities and funds.4  
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Government with a Concentration in Political Theory, 2009, 
University of Virginia. 
1 John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869, 
1869–71 (2003). 
2 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
3 See id. at 237–38 (stating that the complexity of religion in education would 
turn any hard-line standard into a wall “as winding as the famous serpentine wall 
designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded”). 
4 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 
(2000) (holding that University tuition can be used to fund activities that advocate 
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 Throughout the nation, groups have targeted religious 
recognition in the context of governmental operations.5 Thus, a court 
must act with vigilance when deciding whether to afford or deny a 
specific group rights because the court’s decision ultimately may 
implicate the group’s right to expression.6 While the words 
“Separation of Church and State” are not included in the Constitution, 
this long-standing principle has shaped all levels of government 
decision-making when religion enters into secular society.7 The First 
Amendment’s guarantee of religious autonomy has created a peculiar 
labyrinth of standards that the government must follow to accord 
religious groups fair treatment under the law.8 While the Church and 
State are fundamentally separate entities, both must co-exist and 
inherently influence the community’s expectations.9 
The First Amendment states in part that, “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”10 While the Constitution prohibits Congress from 
establishing a national church or taking any religious preference, its 
broad language has begged many questions that the Supreme Court 
has aimed to answer.11 As a result, the Court’s application of the First 
                                                                                                                   
various beliefs); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
835 (1995) (holding that the University’s refusal to fund a religious newspaper 
constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment); Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a university’s denial of funding to 
religious groups using an open forum constituted content discrimination); Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (upholding a university’s right to exclude First 
Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or interfere with other 
student’s education). 
5 See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220–21; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23. 
6 Witte, supra note 1, at 1871–72 (stating that separationism in Supreme Court 
decisions has abandoned harsh application and avoided metaphors). 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Witte, supra note 1, at 1871–72. 
8 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002); Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 841.  
9 Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1667, 1673–74 (2003). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
11 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 263–64 
(1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972). 
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Amendment to specific instances has resulted in various 
inconsistencies.12 
Expectedly, the Court’s application of the First Amendment in 
the context of public education has resulted in significant 
controversy.13 With the proper rearing of our nation’s youth fixed as a 
standard in the public discourse, religion’s role in education has found 
an unsettling lack of direction.14 Spirited debate has resulted about 
when and where religious interjection is appropriate in various stages 
of education.15  Groups have targeted the use of school buildings and 
funds for religious purposes, as well as religious expression by 
practice or speech.16 The Court’s inconsistent decisions have accorded 
religious institutions an expansion of rights that seemingly cross the 
“high and impregnable” wall that separates Church and State.17  
Like minority groups, religious institutions are protected by 
virtue of the reasonableness standard and strict scrutiny.18 The 
standard forbids the government from denying religious institutions 
equal funding or access to a forum where reasonable.19 Rather than 
excluding religious institutions from public venues, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause does 
not trump religious organizations’ freedom of expression.20 If the 
                                                 
12 Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004), with Witters v. Wash. 
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986). 
13 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 1667–70. 
14 See Witte, supra note 1, at 1904. 
15 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001); 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831–32. The Court has created several different categories 
of State forums, as well as multiple degrees of scrutiny and analysis so that specific 
cases come down to trivial differences of when and where State and religious 
interaction can occur. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843. 
16 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 287–28. 
17 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (stating that Thomas 
Jefferson’s 1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association reasoned that the 
Establishment Clause required strict separationism). 
18 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). 
19 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07. 
20 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004).  
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government allowed a secular group access to a public forum, it must 
grant the same access to a religious group.21 Applying the 
reasonableness standard, the Supreme Court has held that any speech, 
including religious speech, cannot be discriminated against unless a 
reasonable interest in creating a limited public forum exists.22 
The Supreme Court has attempted to define the boundaries 
between religion and public education.23 Through the adaptation of the 
Lemon test, the Court established an overarching standard, which 
mandates that schools not discriminate or deny access based on any 
beliefs absent a reasonable justification.24 This aimed to remove any 
preference for one viewpoint over another.25 Such viewpoint 
discrimination would deny all citizens the right to a neutrally-operated 
government by favoring one group over another.26 The Court has since 
molded its analysis on public forum cases around the type of 
discrimination in which the State engages.27 
The First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech, of free 
religious exercise, and against establishment have made it nearly 
impossible for the Court to take any hard stance on religion’s role in 
education.28 While schools have been afforded the ability to create 
limited forums with specific purposes, they are also hard-pressed to 
                                                 
21 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. 
22 Id. 
23 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263–64 
(1981). 
24 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that a policy will 
not offend the Establishment Clause if it passes a three-prong test: (1) The 
government’s action must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the primary effect 
of the government’s action must not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) it must not 
foster and result in “an excessive government entanglement with religion”). 
25 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that viewpoint discrimination is 
an egregious form of content discrimination and that the government must abstain 
from regulating any speech when the restriction is based on the message or 
perspective the speaker is expounding).  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary 
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 401–02. 
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avoid enforcing regulations on religious groups’ various forms of 
expression.29 Schools may define the purpose and uses of such forums 
so as not to discriminate, but may not limit the discourse in which its 
students engage.30 However, these limited forums have created tension 
when they restrict religious expression.31   
Moreover, the same analysis is applied to schools when they 
fund student activities.32 Be it university newspapers, speaker 
presentations, or events by religious organizations, schools are 
generally not allowed to deny funding because of a particular 
viewpoint expressed by those organizations.33 Such funding is subject 
to the same limited forum exceptions as other public forums.34 Again, 
problems arise under the Free Speech, Establishment, and Exercise 
Clauses when affording religious groups public funds.35 
Recent Supreme Court viewpoint discrimination analysis has 
left federal circuits to question when religious recognition has 
overstepped its bounds.36 Some circuits have upheld state denial of 
forums and funds when religious exercises rise to the level of 
worship.37 Alternatively, other circuits have allowed religious groups 
access to forums when their meetings include group prayers, religious 
                                                 
29 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843–44. 
30 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
While these forums are still subject to scrutiny under viewpoint discrimination 
analysis, schools may designate a forum’s boundaries so as not to violate the 
Constitution, federal or state law, or its own rules and regulations. Id. 
31 See generally Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Witte, supra note 1, at 1904. 
32 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834–35. 
33 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S 217, 217 
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S at 824–25; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169–70 
(1972). 
34 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46. 
35 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107. 
36 See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2010); Bronx 
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002). 
37 See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th 
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
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speakers, and numerous other religious activities.38 In many instances, 
what has been found as religious worship or practice in one circuit is 
interpreted as mere public activity by a religious organization in 
another.39 
Such inconsistencies are exemplified in the recent Seventh 
Circuit decision, Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh.40 While the court 
recognized the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s right to create a 
forum for a limited purpose,41 the court held that the university had to 
provide identical funds to both religious groups and other student 
groups.42 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit muddied the line between 
Church and State in public education beyond what is justified by 
precedent, the Constitution, or history.43  
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Badger Catholic departed 
from its previous decisions and misapplied the standards expressed by 
the Supreme Court.44 Moreover, numerous circuits across the country 
have heard cases similar to Badger Catholic and have reasoned 
differently.45 Plainly, the decision chips away at the wall between 
Church and State.46  
                                                 
38 See Prince, 303 F.3d at 1093–94. 
39 Compare Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781, with Bronx Household of Faith, 
492 F.3d at 100–01. 
40 See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775. 
41 Id. at 780–81. 
42 Id. at 779. 
43 See Steven K. Green, Of (Un)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the 
Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1119 
(2002) (discussing the wall of separation between Church and State as defined by 
Justice Black and Thomas Jefferson). 
44 See Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759–60 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (academic freedom and states’ rights require deference to educational 
judgment that is not invidious); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(mere compliance with the Establishment Clause is not a compelling state interest 
that would warrant discrimination against a religious group). 
45 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 104 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
46 See Witte, supra note 1, at 1870–71. 
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In understanding the direction of the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
divergence,47 it is critical to understand judicial precedent as it relates 
to Church and State and the First Amendment. Understanding the 
evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence, along with the purpose of 
the First Amendment, is markedly important because they highlight 
the overarching purpose of the Establishment Clause.48  
Additionally, it is imperative to understand the federal circuits’ 
current interpretations of the relationship between religion and public 
education, as they highlight how the public in general perceives the 
Supreme Court.49 Coming to this understanding will provide insight 
into the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in this area of law.50 
This Comment will examine both the implications and 
potential shortcomings of the Badger Catholic decision.51 With other 
circuits broadening religious interaction in public education, the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Badger Catholic was ultimately decided 
incorrectly.52  
Because the Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear 
standard for circuits to apply, decisions like Badger Catholic represent 
an opportunity to provide clarity.53 Until viewpoint discrimination is 
more clearly explained, public funds and facilities remain in a 
                                                 
47 See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775. 
48 There is constant debate over the exact meaning of the Free Speech, Free 
Exercise, and Establishment Clauses, stretching as far back as the drafting of the 
Constitution and the Federalist Papers, which discussed the proper approach 
American governance should follow. See Witte, supra note 1, at 1871. Recent 
decisions have aimed to carve out an understanding that promotes neutrality of gift 
and denial in relation to religion. See Green, supra note 43, at 1113–14. Generally, 
the court aims to treat religious institutions in the same manner as it would any other 
group. Id. 
49 See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d 89, 92–106 (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
50 See id. 
51 See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775. 
52 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 
(1995); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 914 (9th 
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7 (2008); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002). 
53 See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775. 
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nebulous state that burdens the Seventh Circuit as well as other 




A. What is Separation of Church and State? 
 
 The difficulty in distinguishing between the establishment of 
religion and facilitating its free exercise may be attributed to the 
different understandings of what the Constitution confers through the 
First Amendment.55 In many ways, the Free Speech Clause, the 
Establishment Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause are in constant 
constraint of and contradiction to each other.56 The government is 
barred from the unequal recognition of religious institutions while 
simultaneously providing these institutions the same expressive rights 
that all citizens enjoy.57 As such, it is difficult to determine whether 
the government is merely providing a forum or funding to the citizenry 
and when it is funding religious activity.58  
 The line dividing Church and State is unclear because the 
precedent does not follow one coherent path. Whereas a state cannot 
supplement religious schoolteachers’ salaries,59 it can provide public 
transportation for religious school pupils.60 The State can loan books 
                                                 
54 Laycock, supra note 9, at 1669. 
55 Id. 
56 Indeed, in Locke v. Davey, the Court recognized that there is an inherent 
tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment. 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004). Nevertheless, such tension is relieved as the 
Court’s interpretation allows some “room for play in the joints.” Id. 
57 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Locke, 540 U.S. at 718. 
58 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“the task of separating the secular from the religious in 
education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy”). 
59 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1971) (holding that 
Pennsylvania’s Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act violated the 
Establishment Clause when it reimbursed salaries of nonpublic schoolteachers who 
taught secular material, as well as reimbursed the schools for secular textbooks and 
instructional materials). 
60 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1947). 
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to religious schools, but it cannot loan any supplemental material to 
them.61 Rather than providing a clear rule, these inconsistencies breed 
confusion among the nation’s courts.62 In many ways, the divisions 
drawn by the Supreme Court were agonizingly trivial.63 Nonetheless, 
such decisions aimed to discern what separation actually meant in 
society.64  
Separationism can be divided into three general categories.65 
As postulated by Carl H. Esbeck, separationist views can be classified 
as strict, pluralist, or institutional.66 While strict separationists would 
command a completely secular state, institutional separationists 
envision a theocentric state just short of a theocracy.67 However, what 
jurisprudence has created is a neutral and pluralistic separation 
between Church and State.68 Justice Black attempted to define exactly 
what the separation meant to American society, with the government 
barred from establishing a national church or selectively aiding or 
preferring one religious group to another.69   
 Nevertheless, Justice Black’s view has developed into a fiction 
in actual practice.70 The government has consistently funded various 
religious institutions without any conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses.71 From 
providing tax breaks to churches to facilitating religious activity in 
public buildings, the government has not followed Justice Black’s 
perception of religion’s role in government.72 As such, the conundrum 
                                                 
61 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.  
62 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.  
63 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.  
64 Id. 
65 See Esbeck, supra note 28, at 378–79. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 379 (dividing the separation ideologies into strict separationists, who 
desire a secular state, pluralistic separationists, who desire a neutral state, and 
institutional separationists, who envision a theocentric state).  
68 Id. at 388. 
69 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1947). 
70 Green, supra note 43, at 1119–20. 
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of religious interaction with government is an overwhelming area 
because it involves contradictions in interpretation, viewpoint, and 
jurisprudence.73 This problem is only magnified when a court focuses 
on specific intrusions of religion into government activity.74 In recent 
years, courts have paid special attention to funding and facilitating 
religious activity.75 Regardless of the focus, the separation remains a 
serpentine wall.76  
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Stance 
 
Parsing through the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions dealing 
with religion can be daunting. Perhaps because this is an 
“extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law,”77 the Court has 
struggled to draw hard lines on how religious institutions and 
government funding should interact.78 Nevertheless, the Court’s 
constant refinement of law and its understanding of the First 
Amendment has provided some shape to the lingering questions.79 
 In examining the government’s approach to funding and 
facilitating religious activity, the Court has adopted an evenhanded 
approach so as to neither affirm nor deny any religious group’s 
position.80 To a degree, the government is forbidden from stopping or 
limiting religious expression.81 However, the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause negates the government’s ability to foster these 
activities.82 Even so, the Court has recognized the division between 
Church and State as something other than a complete barrier.83 
                                                 
73 See id. 
74 See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
75 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. 
76 See Witte, supra note 1, at 1869. 
77 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
78 See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
79 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972). 
80 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002).  
81 See id. 
82 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835–36. 
83 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 41–44 (1947). 
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Because religion is an integral part of American society and values, it 
shapes how we understand the very question it aims to answer.84 In 
doing so, religion has gained many liberties, which in turn has created 
a labyrinth of jurisprudence that precludes any possibility of clear 
guidance for lower courts to follow.85 
 Adding to the complexity of the relationship between Church 
and State, public education provides a sensitive area where society 
demands religious independence, yet such independence cannot 
encroach on religion’s involvement in the student’s life outside 
school.86 In addressing the ability of religious groups to operate in the 
public sphere, the Court has concentrated on the State’s purpose in 
enacting its rules.87   
 
1. Tests in Development 
  
 In addressing the relationship between Church and State, the 
Court has developed several tests that help to understand exactly what 
principles the First Amendment aims to protect.88 Historically, the 
Establishment Clause has been analyzed under the three-pronged test 
developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman.89 The test requires that government 
action (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not have the effect of either 
advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) not result in government 
entanglement with religion.90 The Lemon test has become integral to 
framing how public education and religious organizations must 
                                                 
84 Green, supra note 43, at 1118–19. 
85 Id.  
86 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Witte, supra note 1, 
at 1904. 
87 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001). 
88 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union., 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
(coercion test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (endorsement test); Lemon, 
403 U.S. 602 (Lemon test); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (neutrality test); Ralph D. Mawdsley 
& Johan Beckmann, Religion in Public Schools: An American and South African 
Perspective, 204 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 445, 454 (2006). 
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coexist.91 
 Recent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to guide the 
federal circuits.92 The Court analyzed situations based on whether the 
government was discriminating against the viewpoint of certain 
speech, or the content of that speech.93 The Court has held viewpoint 
discrimination as a more egregious form of content-based 
discrimination.94 Generally, the government is forbidden from denying 
religious organizations access when the denial is based purely on the 
propagated message.95 Likewise, content discrimination is 
presumptively unconstitutional due to its focus on the content of what 
a group is saying.96 Though these categories are markedly similar, 
content discrimination has faced less scrutiny and has been found 
acceptable in some situations.97 Through this analysis, the Court has 
aimed to prevent discrimination of a particular group based on its 
views or actions, while allowing the government to set the parameters 
for the time, place, and manner in which the speech is made.98  
 Additionally, the Court has allowed the government to separate 
religious and government activity by creating limited public forums.99 
While open forums require the state to provide full protection and 
funding for all speech, a government institution that establishes a 
                                                 
91 See Mawdsley & Beckmann, supra note 88, at 455 (“While framed in the 
context of government financial support for religious schools, the Lemon test has 
been invoked in a wide range of religion cases to both prohibit and permit efforts to 
accommodate religious beliefs in public schools and permit government support for 
religious schools.”). 
92 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
93 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108.  
94 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
95 See id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 
(1983). 
96 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981). 
97 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). 
98 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (the 
time, place, and manner test is applicable only to speech regulations that are content 
neutral). 
99 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278. 
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limited forum for a particular purpose may regulate the use of that 
forum.100  
 Whether it is dealing with elementary schools or public 
universities, the government must tread lightly so as not to overstep its 
citizens’ rights as well as the rights of religious organizations.101  
 
2. Content and Viewpoint Discrimination 
 
 In many ways, content and viewpoint discrimination are 
ambiguous.102 Discrimination against speech is presumed to be 
unconstitutional.103 Likewise, the First Amendment is breached 
whenever the government places financial burdens on groups because 
of the subject matter of their speech.104 Content discrimination occurs 
when government intervention is based on a speaker’s actions rather 
than the subject matter of his or her speech.105 Generally, the content 
of the speech being expounded cannot be the focus of governmental 
prejudice.106 Such regulations explicitly or implicitly presume to 
regulate the speech because of the substance of the message.107 
Furthermore, the Court has developed the notion of viewpoint 
discrimination, which constitutes a more egregious form of content 
discrimination.108 Viewpoint discrimination violations target the 
specific ideology behind an opinion that the group or speaker is 
presenting.109 Such regulations are imposed because of a disagreement 
                                                 
100 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010). 
101 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 
(1995). 
102 Id. at 828. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 843. 
105 See Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1137 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
106 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
107 Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
108 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
109 See Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
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with the particular position that the speaker expounds.110 Thus, content 
discrimination always occurs when viewpoint discrimination does, but 
not vice versa.111  
 The Court has examined situations where the government has 
refused to fund religious groups under a Free Exercise analysis, as 
well as situations where the government recognized religious groups’ 
rights under the Establishment Clause.112  
 In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District, a school district provided its facilities to community groups, 
yet refused a church’s request to show religious films.113 The Court 
held that because the school district opened its doors to the public, it 
could not refuse organizations merely because they were religious.114 
The school’s focus on the subject matter of the speech, rather than on 
the manner in which it was being expressed, constituted viewpoint 
discrimination.115 Following Lamb’s Chapel, the Court attempted to 
define the differences between viewpoint and content 
discrimination.116 
 Just as schools cannot close their doors to religious groups 
merely because they are religious, they cannot deny them funding 
where there are secular parallels to the activities that receive 
funding.117 Whether it is the printing and distribution of newspapers 
on campus118 or disbursement of federal scholarships to students 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an especially egregious form of 
content discrimination in which the government targets not just subject matter, but 
the particular views taken on subjects by speakers.”). 
112 Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004), with Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2001). 
113 508 U.S. 384, 389–90 (1993). 
114 Id. at 392. 
115 Id. at 391. 
116 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 
(1995). 
117 Id. 
118 See id. at 845–46 (holding that the University’s refusal to fund a campus 
organization’s publication, written from a Christian viewpoint, when other 
publications from other viewpoints were funded violated the Free Speech Clause: 
“[the University’s] course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and 
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pursing religious training,119 public institutions must maintain a 
neutral stance on how they conduct their activities.120  
 In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of 
California, Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, the Court held that a 
publicly-funded law school’s anti-discrimination policy could be 
evenly applied to all groups that it funded, including religious 
groups.121 There, a Christian society at the school barred homosexuals 
from joining the organization.122 Because this was in violation of the 
school’s anti-discrimination policy, the law school denied the group 
funding and access to its facilities.123 The Court found that the 
school’s policy was applicable to all organizations in the school and 
thus did not single out the religious group.124 In fact, the Court noted 
that because the policy was so inclusive, it was impossible to contend 
that it was discriminatory against any one group.125 When a public 
university implements regulations on a limited public forum, it can 
decide the parameters of the content that that forum allows, but views 
that fit within the parameters cannot be discriminated against.126 
 Contrastingly, in Locke v. Davey, a student pursing a degree in 
theology was denied a government-funded scholarship and contended 
that this was discrimination in contravention of the Free Exercise 
Clause.127 The Court disagreed, reasoning that the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause allow some “play in the joints 
between them.”128 While the government could not hinder the 
student’s pursuits, funding his pursuits would amount to providing for 
                                                                                                                   
would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine 
the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires”). 
119 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
120 Id. at 649–50. 
121 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 (2010). 
122 Id. at 2979–80. 
123 Id. at 2989. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 2993 (“It is, after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy 
than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”) (emphasis in original). 
126 Id. 
127 540 U.S. 712, 717–18 (2004). 
128 Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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religious training.129 The school was allowed to participate in its own 
form of government speech by deciding the limits of what it endorses, 
and what it does not.130 So long as the institution is not evincing 
hostility towards religion in its actions, it is not required to supply 
funds or access to religious institutions merely because a secular 
alternative exists.131 
 The directions in Locke are not applicable across the board.132 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, taxpayers challenged a scholarship 
program that funded recipients who attended religious schools.133 The 
scholarship program aimed to allow parents and students the ability to 
attend any school of their choice.134 The Court held that the 
scholarship program was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
because the program was neutral and provided funding to a broad class 
of citizens.135 The fact that the families directed the funding to 
religious institutions was not unconstitutional.136 As the school had 
created an open forum for its students, it could not discriminate against 
certain institutions merely because they support religion.137 However, 
the Court’s decision faced serious criticism because it appeared as 
indirect preferential treatment for religion.138 By providing funding to 
parents who chose private religious institutions over public schools, 
the separation between Church and State became a farce.139 
 The commingling of content and viewpoint discrimination 
looks to be a mess of precedent.140 Nevertheless, distinctions in their 
                                                 
129 Id. at 725. 
130 Id. at 729–30. 
131 Id. at 724–25 (the state had a substantial interest in not funding the pursuit 
of devotional degrees). 
132 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 647. 
135 Id. at 652–53. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 652. 
138 Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
139 Id. 
140 Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717–18 (2004), with Zelman, 536 
U.S. at 648–49. 
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analysis exist.141 The government “is not required to and does not 
allow persons to engage in every type of speech”; content 
discrimination is appropriate when the restrictions are “reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum.”142 Conversely, viewpoint 
discrimination is generally prohibited in open forums as well as 
limited forums.143 While the views of a speaker cannot be the basis of 
State regulation, the Court has endorsed the idea that universities can 
focus a forum on a specific, intentional purpose and regulate speech 
that falls outside that content.144 
 
3. Open and Limited Forums 
 
 In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court also addressed the issue of when a 
government creates a forum.145 There, a church sued a school district 
because it was refused access to facilities to show religious films on 
family values.146 The Court recognized that the school district was 
allowed to preserve property under its control and dictate its use.147 
However, because the school district did not intentionally define the 
limits of the forum, thus creating an open forum, it could not deny the 
church access because of its religion.148 
 In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court held 
that a school conducted viewpoint discrimination because it refused a 
religious youth club access to its facilities after school hours.149 The 
                                                 
141 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 
(1995). 
142 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
143 Id. at 107. 
144 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985).  
145 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 
2144 (1993). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 2146. 
148 Id. at 2148. Though the Court recognized that there may be a compelling 
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation, an open access policy to the 
forum allowed religious use of the property. Id. 
149 533 U.S. 98, 107–08 (2001). 
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Court rejected the school’s argument that granting access would be 
government endorsement amounting to a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.150 On the contrary, permitting the school to 
deny the religious organization access would be just as threatening to 
the Constitution as allowing that organization access.151 Critically, the 
Court viewed the school as an open facility, rather than a limited 
forum.152 Just as in Lamb’s Chapel, a forum open to the public had 
been created without intentional limits.153 
 Moreover, a forum does not necessarily have to be a physical 
space; funding can represent a metaphysical forum.154 In Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court held that 
there was no difference between a public school funding a physical 
facility and giving students access to its funds to pay for activities.155 
The Court recognized that a university may appropriate public funds to 
promote particular policies as it wishes, so creating a limited forum.156 
In order to do so, it need only intentionally create the forum and set 
out its limits and purpose.157 From that point, the forum is judged as to 
whether its limits are reasonable in light of its defined purpose.158 
 In creating a limited forum, the State must distinguish it from 
the traditional or open public forum.159 In that sense, the restrictions 
that the government imposes on an open forum are placed under 
greater scrutiny than those imposed on a limited public forum.160 In 
limited public forums, the government opens property for use by 
certain groups and dictates its use.161 




153 See id. at 109; Lamb’s Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. 
154 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
155 Id. at 843. 
156 Id. at 833. 
157 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985). 
158 Id. at 806. 
159 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
160 Id. 
161 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. 
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 Additionally, there is another division between these two types 
of forums.162 While there is the traditional open forum, and the limited 
public forum, there also exists a designated public forum.163 In the 
case of a designated public forum, the Court uses strict scrutiny to 
ensure that the government does not unreasonably restrict speech in 
the nontraditional space.164 While a traditional open public forum 
usually uses public spaces like parks and streets, a designated public 
forum uses spaces that are not typically open to the public.165 
 Deciding what type of forum a school creates is critical 
because it changes the analysis under the neutrality test.166 If a forum 
is left open to the public, content and viewpoint discrimination are 
subject to harsher treatment and the State’s restrictions are subject to 
strict scrutiny.167 Alternatively, a limited public forum’s restrictions 
need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of its 
purpose.168 Therefore, knowing whether a university has reasonably 






                                                 
162 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010).  
163 Id. 
164 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985); see also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008). 
165 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. Universities and schools can fall into all 
three categories, but generally, they fall into either a traditional open forum or a 
limited public forum. See id. These spaces are usually open to and funded by the 
public. See id. However, unless the school sets a purpose for its facilities, they are 
presumed to be “nonpublic forum[s]”—property that “is not by tradition or design a 
forum for public communication.” See Choose Life Ill., 547 F.3d at 864. 
166 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30; 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.  
167 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983. 
168 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).  
169 See Choose Life Ill., 547 F.3d at 864. 
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C. Division Among Circuits 
 
 Not surprisingly, the lack of specific direction from the 
Supreme Court has led to varying approaches on how to decide the 
constitutionality of forum restrictions. While some circuits have been 
more rigid in their understanding of what an open forum is and when 
viewpoint discrimination actually occurs, opposing views still linger. 
 In Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City 
of New York, the Second Circuit addressed the State’s refusal to permit 
church use of school facilities for Sunday worship.170 There, under 
two concurring opinions, the court vacated the permanent injunct
enjoining the school district from enforcing its prohibition against 
religious use.
ion 
                                                
171 The court decided that the State’s restriction on 
worship was not viewpoint discrimination.172 Because the purpose of 
the Bronx Household was specifically for worship, it fell outside the 
content of the school’s purpose and was properly denied.173 
 In the Ninth Circuit case, Prince v. Jacoby, a high school 
student brought an action against a school district because it refused to 
allow a bible club the same benefits that it does to other clubs.174 
Namely, the club was given different access to school supplies, 
audio/visual equipment and school vehicles.175 The court held that the 
different treatment of the bible club from other school-sanctioned 
clubs was in violation of the First Amendment under Widmar.176 The 
school created a limited public forum and chose to give benefits to 
groups; having done so, it could not restrict a group’s access to these 
benefits based on the group’s views.177 The court further held that 
even if it were not an open forum, the State did not have unlimited 
power to restrict speech, and any restriction had to be viewpoint-
 
170 492 F.3d 89, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2007). 
171 Id. at 90–123. 
172 Id. at 98–99. 
173 Id. at 100–01. 
174 303 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 
175 Id. 
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neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum.”178 Because the restriction against the bible club was based 
purely on its religious viewpoint, the restriction was 
unconstitutional.179  
 In another Ninth Circuit case, Tucker v. State of California 
Department of Education, an employee sued the State for a ban on  
displays of religious material and religious advocacy by employees.180  
The court there held that such a restriction was unwarranted under the 
First Amendment.181 Again, the court emphasized that the State had 
not created a limited forum and could not constitutionally restrict its 
employees’ speech.182 Although this particular case involved a state 
employee and was subject to another type of analysis,183 analysis 
under viewpoint discrimination and open forum precedent was still 
appropriate.184 Pursuant to Widmar and Rosenberger, the court 
decided that there was no “plausible fear” that the employee’s speech 
would be attributed to the State and implicate the Establishment 
Clause.185 As such, the State’s ban was unconstitutional.186 
 While the Ninth Circuit has recognized that religious 
discrimination in open forums is generally not permissible,187 it has 
held prohibitions limiting religious organizations constitutional when 
                                                 
178 Id. The school officially recognized and allowed full access to “groups that 
engage in any lawful activity which promotes the academic, vocational, personal, or 
social/civil/cultural growth of students.” Id. at 1091–92 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
179 Id.  
180 97 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996). 
181 Id. at 1209–10. 
182 Id. at 1209 (“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or 
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional 
forum for public discourse”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
183 The court decided that Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968), was the controlling analysis for government employee speech. Tucker, 97 
F.3d at 1210.  
184 Id. at 1211.  
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1213. 
187 Prince, 303 F.3d at 1074; Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1213. 
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the State creates a limited public forum.188 In Faith Center Church 
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, the court held that a library 
constituted a limited public forum because the State intentionally 
dedicated its property for expressive conduct.189 The court set out the 
different levels of scrutiny applicable to open forums, nonpublic 
forums, and limited public forums.190 In traditional public forums, like 
streets and parks, the State can engage in content-based regulations 
when it is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [when it 
is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”191 Regulation in nonpublic 
forums is less demanding: restrictions need only be reasonable and not 
enforced against the speaker’s view.192 The court determined that the 
library did not fall into either of these categories because the State did 
not make the meeting room open for indiscriminate use; it excluded 
use by schools “for instructional purposes as a regular part of the 
curriculum,” as well as use for religious services.193 Nevertheless, 
pursuant to Good News Club v. Milford Central School,194 there was a 
distinction between religious activity and mere religious worship 
devoid of any moral teachings.195 As such, the court listed various 
activities, like effective communication of a group’s goals, the 
discussion of religious books, teaching, praying, singing, and sharing 
testimonials as permissible. However, pure religious worship is not a 
viewpoint but a category of content, and can be properly excluded.196 
 It is clear from just these few cases discussing the boundaries 
of limited public forums and its relationship to viewpoint 
discrimination that the circuits are engaging in complex precedential 
                                                 
188 See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 910 
(9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
189 Id. at 907. 
190 Id. at 907–08. 
191 Id. at 907 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. at 907–08. 
193 Id. at 909. 
194 See 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001). 
195 Glover, 480 F.3d at 913–14. 
196 Id. at 915. 
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weaving.197 What is apparent is that when a State creates a limited 
public forum, it is within its power to restrict religious activity like 
worship.198 While the government must allow some activity 
“quintessentially religious” in nature, not all religious activity is 
protected under the doctrines of neutrality.199 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
A. Decisions Before Badger Catholic 
 
 The Seventh Circuit has addressed the issues surrounding the 
Establishment Clause, religion in public institutions, and the scope of 
forum creation in various recent cases.200  
 In one instance, several churches challenged an ordinance that 
restricted the use of land zoned for commercial and business uses.201 
The court looked to the motivation for the regulations and determined 
that the city was not motivated by a disagreement with the churches’ 
message but rather was concerned with the effective use of land.202 As 
this was a viewpoint-neutral purpose and a reasonable restriction of 
the land’s use, the court held that it was constitutional.203 
 In Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System, students challenged the mandatory activity fee that 
the University imposed on grounds that such a fee amounted to 
                                                 
197 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 92–93 
(2d Cir. 2007); Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996).  
198 See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 101. 
199 See id.; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001). 
200 Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008); Christian 
Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006); Civil Liberties 
forUrban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580 (7th Cir. 
2002).  
201 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 758–
59 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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support for views to which they objected.204 The court held that the fee 
was reasonable and that the fund constituted a metaphysical limited 
public forum.205 Even so, the court held that the student government 
that defined the parameters of the forum was not entitled to unbridled 
discretion.206 Instead, it had to develop specific and concrete standards 
guiding its funding decision.207 So while the court recognized that the 
University could create a limited forum that could discriminate against 
certain content, these limits would have to be spelled out 
specifically.208 
 The court also examined the application of neutrality in 
Christian Legal Society v. Walker.209 There, a student organization 
sued a public law school after it was derecognized for excluding 
homosexuals from its organization’s voting membership, citing that it 
was entitled to free speech and free exercise of religion.210 The school 
had a nondiscrimination policy that was concededly viewpoint-neutral; 
however, the court questioned whether it was applied in a viewpoint-
neutral way.211 Although the court noted that denying recognition to a 
student organization is a significant infringement, it still found that the 
group showed a likelihood of success on its claim that the school 
unconstitutionally derecognized it.212 In doing so, the court recognized 
that a student organization could be restrictive if found to be a limited 
public forum.213 Here, the court was concerned with the student’s 
expressive rights.214 Even with a viewpoint-neutral stance, it is 
                                                 
204 307 F.3d at 570–71.  




209 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (2006). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 866.  
212 Id. at 867. 
213 Id. at 866. 
214 Id. at 867 (the policy would significantly affect the organization’s ability to 
express its disapproval of homosexuality). 
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possible for a university to improperly restrict the activities of its 
students.215 
 Likewise, Doe v. Small addressed the use of public spaces by 
religious groups.216 There, action was sought to enjoin the display of a 
religious painting in a park.217 The injunction ordered by the district 
court that forbade the painting was held overly broad.218 The Seventh 
Circuit determined that the park, as a public forum, must accept 
religious speech.219 By limiting expression, the State does not act 
neutrally, but is hostile towards the religious groups’ viewpoint.220 
The court instructed that any restriction placed on the open forum 
must be narrowly tailo 221red.  
                                                
 In Choose Life Illinois v. White, the court addressed the 
definition of public forums.222 An anti-abortion group sought to 
compel the State to issue “Choose Life” license plates.223 After 
deciding that license plates did not constitute government speech,224 
the court held that they were a limited public forum.225 Because the 
plates had not been open for general public discourse, the court 
concluded that the State had not intentionally opened the 
nontraditional forum for public use.226 In the end, the court concluded 
 
215 See id. 
216 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992). 
217 Id. at 612–13. 
218 Id. at 621. 
219 Id. at 619. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 621 (“The district court’s order was not narrowly tailored because it 
sought to eliminate the display of the paintings ‘by any party’ instead of limiting it to 
the ‘evil’ of the City’s alleged endorsement of the painting alone.”). 
222 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 863 (“Messages on specialty license plates cannot be characterized as 
the government’s speech. Like many states, Illinois invites private civic and 
charitable organizations to place their messages on specialty license plates. The 
plates serve as ‘mobile billboards’ for the organizations and like-minded vehicle 
owners to promote their causes and also are a lucrative source of funds.”). 
225 Id. at 864–65 (declining to qualify license plates as an open or designated 
forum). 
226 Id. at 864. 
 254
25
Graves: Papa Don't Preach: <em>Badger Catholic v. Walsh</em> Muddies the
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
that the government was allowed to restrict this area based on the 
content of the message.227 As it had restricted all license plate designs 
that addressed abortion, rather than targeting only the pro-life view, 
the government was engaging in content discrimination.228 The court 
held this restriction reasonable in light of the plates’ purpose, 
especially since the State evinced no hostility towards any particular 
view.229 
 Additionally, in Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue 
University, students sought to enjoin a play that a university was 
presenting because it evinced anti-Christian beliefs.230 Though the 
court recognized that a university policy promoting a particular belief 
would violate the First Amendment, merely allowing students to 
choose a play and display it did not amount to endorsement.231 The 
court stated that just as a classroom is not a public forum, neither is a 
university theater.232 Moreover, it recognized the need for academic 
freedom:  
 
If an Establishment Clause violation arose each time a 
student believed that a school practice either advanced 
or disapproved of a religion, school curricula would be 
reduced to the lowest common denominator, 
permitting each student to become a ‘curriculum 
review committee’ unto himself.233  
 
The court urged that educational deference and deference to State’s 
rights are required so long as the action is not invidious.234 Again, the 
court recognized the rights that universities have in defining and 
funding their actions.235 This decision was criticized, as there was no 
                                                 
227 Id. at 865. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 260 F.3d 757, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2001). 
231 Id. at 759–60. 
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evidence that the University allowed other theater groups to use its 
stage, and its choice of one ideology and denial of others constituted 
viewpoint discrimination.236  
 These cases demonstrate the breadth of application that the 
court has made in viewpoint discrimination and limited forum cases. 
When the State acts against a religious group, or any group for that 
matter, it must be motivated by something other than the group’s 
views.237 Moreover, when it creates a limited forum, it needs to 
specify the limits of that forum, so it is readily identifiable which 
content is not allowed.238 It is also important to recognize that the 
mere existence of a viewpoint-neutral policy does not mean that its 
application will also be viewpo 239int-neutral.   
                                                
 
B. Badger Catholic 
 
 Decided in 2010, Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh involved a 
religious group at the University of Wisconsin and its attempt to gain 
funding for its activities.240 The school collects nearly $400 from each 
of its students in order to provide for a variety of non-instructional 
student services and programs.241 These funds are made available to 
qualifying student organizations, which include those that engage in 
“expressive activities, concerts, some athletic activities, and 
recreational activities.”242 Additionally, the fund’s purpose was to 
“provide a source of funds to ensure that students have the means to 
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, 
social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life 
 
236 Id. at 767 (Coffey, J., dissenting).  
237 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
238 See Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
239 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006). 
240 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2010). 
241 Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
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outside the lecture hall.”243 In order to gain access to these funds, 
student organizations must meet criteria primarily set by the student 
government.244 Moreover, the University stated that the forum was 
developed to foster “dialogue, or discussion, or debate.”245  
 In 2005, the University of Wisconsin Roman Catholic 
Foundation (RCF) began to seek reimbursement from the school’s 
fund.246 Though the school expressed concerns about RCF’s 
eligibility,247 it eventually approved the group as a registered student 
organization.248 In achieving eligibility, RCF submitted to student 
control and agreed not to seek funding for “masses, weddings, 
funerals, or other sacramental acts requiring the direct control of 
ordained clergy.”249  
 Although by 2007, RCF was allowed to seek funding, the 
University did not fund RCF’s activities in their entirety.250 
Specifically, the University concluded that it could not reimburse four 
of RCF’s expenditures because they were for worship, proselytizing, 
or sectarian religious instruction.251 RCF provided a mentoring 
program with spiritual directors for spiritual mentoring,252 a training 
institute for the organization’s leaders to gain perspective on how to 
talk about prayer, worship, and the Catholic faith,253 a drum shield 
                                                 
243 Id. (emphasis added). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 1134 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
246 Id. at 1127. 
247 Id. The RCF was not a recognized student organization originally. While it 
later met the criteria under the student government’s mandates, it initially struggled 
as it had members who were not University students. Id. Moreover, it was not 
controlled by students but by the St. Paul’s Catholic Center and various religious 
officials, including a pastor and bishop. Id. The organization was also in violation 
because it did not allow non-Catholics to participate in its meetings. Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id.  
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 The spiritual mentors included nuns and priests who would talk to the 
students about anything they wanted to talk about for a half-hour. Id. at 1127–28. 
253 These meetings included a variety of activities including masses, prayer, and 
worship services. Id. at 1128. 
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used in praise and worship bands, and the cost of a Rosary 
instructional pamphlet that told students how to pray the Rosary.254 By 
the time the case reached the court, the University had also denied 
RCF funding for a summer training camp that trained the 
organization’s leaders and included several masses, communal 
prayers, and worship programs.255 Moreover, the University denied 
funding for a program that brought nuns from Italy to Madison to meet 
with the group’s students to advise them on their “path in the world” 
and determine whether they should “be a priest, or religious, or . . . 
married.”256 While the school did not fund these activities, it still 
funded the majority of RCF’s actions, including large and small group 
discussion, education and service offerings, theater and choral 
activities, and welcoming activities.257 
 The district court determined that the fund that the University 
created constituted a nonphysical forum under Rosenberger and stated 
that such a forum was required to distribute reimbursements on a 
viewpoint-neutral basis.258 Likening the case to Rosenberger, the court 
referred to the University of Virginia’s rejected argument that the 
publications primarily promoted or manifested a particular belief in or 
about a deity or an ultimate reality.259 Just as that was considered a 
limited public forum, so too was the University of Wisconsin’s 
fund.260 The court concluded that the University was entitled to adopt 
reasonable content-based restrictions on the limited forum, but that its 
current denials were too broad.261 The court noted that merely labeling 
types of speech as dialogue or worship was not dispositive of whether 
the regulations were constitutional.262 Instead, the University would 
have to explain its choices in funding and needed to analyze the 
                                                 
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 1129–30. 
259 Id. at 1130; see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 822–30. 
260 Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. 
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specific content of each disputed activity, rather than rely on highly 
abstract labels.263 
 In Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.264 The court 
rejected the argument that funding prayer, proselytizing, or religious 
instruction would violate the Establishment Clause.265 Instead, it held 
that because the University had decided that nonreligious counseling 
groups were within the forum’s scope, it could not exclude religious 
groups offering prayer as a means of counseling.266 Furthermore, the 
court did not agree that the University was allowed to make this 
decision, whether or not the Establishment Clause required it.267 
Relying on Locke, the court stressed that the State’s program should 
not evince hostility towards religion.268 Though Locke noted that 
schools could speak through their decisions about which programs to 
support, such as having a department on philosophy but not theology, 
the court held that the forum created by the University of Wisconsin 
was not to propagate its own message, but to provide its students the 
ability to speak.269 The court concluded that the University cannot 
shape Badger Catholic’s message by selectively funding speech of 
which it approves, and not funding views of which it disapproved.270 
Because the University created a public forum, it had to accept all 




                                                 
263 Id. at 1134–35. 
264 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010). 
265 Id. at 778. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 779. 
268 Id. at 780; see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724–25 (2004). 
269 Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 780. The court noted that this seemed like an 
overly formalistic distinction. Id. Nevertheless, it qualified its holding because the 
University of Wisconsin had previously told the Supreme Court that it would 
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A. Overarching Problem 
 
 Religion in public education is much like Pandora’s box, 
unleashing an area of the law that lends itself to excessive 
complication and entanglement.272 Regardless of the standard or test 
applied by the courts, religion has faced a burden unlike any other 
institution in American democracy.273 Focusing specifically on 
content and viewpoint discrimination, courts have struggled to apply




                                                
274 In one instance, a court may
find that the government is acting constitutionally, while another court 
may find activity of nearly the same nature unconstitutional.275 T
different circuits have reached markedly different results.276  
 The Seventh Circuit’s holding, which determined what public 
universities must fund, is perilous.277 In an attempt to make the 
situation clearer for government institutions, Badger Catholic 
unnecessarily integrates Church and State.278 Ironically, the goal that 
 
272 See Witte, supra note 1, at 1904. 
273 See Esbeck, supra note 28, at 371–72. 
274 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 99–100 
(2d Cir. 2007) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where a church was 
permitted to use school facilities for Sunday service); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 
1074, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a school to give bible club access to 
facilities even though it conducted religious speech); Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trustees of 
Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no First Amendment 
violation where a public university presented a student play that evinced anti-
Christian beliefs). 
275 Compare Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 100, with Prince, 303 F.3d 
at 1093. 
276 See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 99–100; Prince, 303 F.3d at 
1092–93; Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759–60. 
277 See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., dissenting); Green, supra note 43, at 1118–19. 
278 See Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 789 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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the Seventh Circuit hoped to achieve may end up working towards an 
opposite end.279 
 The problem stems from the constant battle between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.280 The tests 
developed to handle the varying issues under each clause fail to 
address the true complexity of the problem—resulting in the Supreme 
Court’s inability to come to a clear answer.281 Decisions like Badger 
Catholic exemplify the inherent problem that American jurisprudence 
has created for itself.282 Whether with respect to funding or facilitating 
in some manner, analyzing religion’s role in education under 
independent tests developed for specific clauses of the First 
Amendment belittles the magnitude of the situation.283 
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Badger Catholic placed an 
unnecessary burden on the State and forced the government as well as 
students to implicitly endorse various religious activities, regardless of 
their own ideology.284 By concluding that the forum in Badger 
Catholic was an open forum, the Seventh Circuit missed the direction 
of the law and misinterpreted the purpose of viewpoint discrimination 
analysis.285 What the University created was a forum for a specific 
purpose and with concrete limitations.286 These limitations were 
                                                 
279 See id. at 781 (the court aimed to define parameters that would enforce 
neutrality towards religion). 
280 See Green, supra note 43, at 1126–27. 
281 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
282 See Green, supra note 43, at 1132 (“[E]venhanded neutrality is incomplete 
as a constitutional doctrine because it fails to account for the other important values 
that inform the religion clauses, such as protecting religious liberty and autonomy, 
ensuring religious (and secular) equality, alleviating religious dissension, and 
protecting the legitimacy and integrity of both government and religion. A focus on 
neutrality, however, discounts these values of liberty, equality, diffusion, and 
government integrity.”). 
283 Id. at 1131–32.  
284 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001). 
285 See Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781; Green, supra note 43, at 1135–36.  
286 Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 783 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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publicly available and reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and 
the tenets of the Constitution.287   
Plainly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision failed to recognize that 
public institutions have the ability to stop some activity and are 
required in some instances to limit religious speech so that religion 
receives no preferential treatment from the State.288 There is a specific 
distinction between the state providing equal access to all groups 
regardless of their views and the funding and propagating of religious 
worship and activity.289 While the former is necessarily protected 
under the First Amendment, the latter represents an unreasonable 
encroachment.290 
In looking at where to go from here, the Seventh Circuit must 
understand the true movement of its own law as well as how the 
Establishment Clause was meant to affect religion.291 What has 
occurred here is but a tremor of what may come if other circuits follow 
the same route.292  
 
B. Badger Catholic Detailed 
 
 The Seventh Circuit failed to recognize the University of 
Wisconsin’s prerogative to create a limited forum and restrict access to 
that forum based on the content of activities.293 Specifically, the 
University created the forum to foster discussion of philosophical, 
religious, scientific, social, and political subjects.294 Moreover, it fully 
                                                 
287 Id. 
288 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972). 
289 Green, supra note 43, at 1131–32.  
290 Id. 
291 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 
2003); Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580 (7th 
Cir. 2002).  
292 See Green, supra note 43, at 1135–36.   
293 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). 
294 Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
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funded dialogue and debate on these topics.295 What it did not fund 
was any form of worship, proselytizing, or religious instruction.296 All 
student organizations could access this fund so long as they stayed 
within these limits.297 In doing so, the University created a specific 
limited forum.298  
 However, the court stretched the tenets of neutrality to 
demolish the barriers that the University created.299 By requiring the 
school to reimburse Badger Catholic on the same basis that it 
reimburses other groups, the court missed the mark.300 While facially, 
this approach appears viewpoint-neutral, it degraded what these 
activities actually were.301 The court seemed to see no difference 
between students mentoring students and students seeking advice from 
nuns and priests.302 However, there is a significant difference.303 
While one is a discussion and dialogue about various social problem
at a school, the other is religious instruction.
s 
hat 
                                                
304 It is not far-fetched 
that nuns and priests will be giving particular religious instruction t
cannot be rivaled by a secular counterpart.305 By its very nature, 
 
295 Id. at 1134. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1126.  
298 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).  
299 See Green, supra note 43, at 1131–32. 
300 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995). 
301 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., dissenting). 
302 See id. at 779 (majority opinion). 
303 Id. at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“If religion, and the practice of one’s 
religion, can be described as merely dialog or debate from a religious perspective, 
what work does the Free Exercise [C]lause of the First Amendment do?”); see also  
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Worship is adoration, not ritual; and any other 
characterization of it is both profoundly demeaning and false.”). 
304 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“Religion . . . provides . . . a specific 
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be 
discussed and considered.”). 
305 Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 578 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1127–28 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
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religious mentoring is on a level fundamentally different from student 
dialogue.306 It represents a spiritual experience.307 There is no 
comparison between the two, and trying to draw congruence only 
denigrates the value of religion.308  
 All of the activity for which the University rejected funding 
follows this same analysis.309 A training institute for the 
organization’s leaders that conducts mass, prayer, and worship 
sessions is not equivalent to a normal organization’s leadership 
training.310 The same applies to the summer training camp that it 
conducted.311 These are exercises in religious devotion and 
proselytizing, not mere training.312  
 Moreover, the pamphlets that Badger Catholic distributes differ





actually were.317 The six activities that it did not fund plainly did not 
                                                
313 While 
the newspapers were intended to give religious perspective and advic
on current topics, Badger Catholic’s pamphlets were instructions on 
worship.314 It instructed members on the rosary and how to pray it.31
This is markedly different from evincing a religious perspective.316  
 That the University funded all but 9% of Badger Catholic’s
activities also lends some insight into how specific its limitations 
 
306 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
307 See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 102. 
308 Id. 
309 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). 
310 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., dissenting). 
311 Id. 
312 See Green, supra note 43, at 1120–21. 
313 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826–27 
(1995).  
314 Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827, with Roman Catholic Found., UW-
Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. 
Wis. 2008). 
315 Roman Catholic Found., 578 F.Supp.2d at 1128. 
316 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827. 
317 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., dissenting). 
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further the forum’s goals.318 This was reasonable content 
discrimination.319 By forbidding worship, proselytizing, or religious 
instruction, the University did not target religious views generally or 
Catholicism specifically.320 Instead, it forbade actions.321 Presumably, 
any group that might seek reimbursement under these categories 
would be rejected.322 The court attempted to liken Badger Catholic’s 
activities to secular counterparts and missed the point of these 
activities.323  
 The court also incorrectly assumed that worship and 
proselytizing are automatically religious.324 It is just as likely that a 
student group could form to worship and proselytize for a sports team 
or a pop star.325 These are categories of conduct, not religious 
views.326 The separation is only magnified by the unrivaled 
equivalency that religion creates for itself.327 That mass, prayer, and 
worship are typically religious and hold no secular equal does not 
mean that the actions amount to a viewpoint.328 Instead, it 
demonstrates the specificity that the University has created in its 
forum.329 Mentoring programs are not the equivalent of religious 
                                                 
318 Id. 
319 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 
(1981). 
320 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.  
321 See id. 
322 Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
323 See id. at 777–78 (majority opinion). 
324 See id. at 778–79. 
325 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001). 
326 Id. 
327 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
328 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826–27 
(1995).  
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mentoring because the latter incorporates a specific level of worship 
and prayer outside the scope of the forum’s purpose.330 
 Finally, the court ignored the academic deference that it had 
previously exercised and the well-respected notion that the State can 
preserve property under its control so long as the self-created barriers 
are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.331 With scarce resources 
available, the University is allowed to decide which projects and 
conduct it wishes to fund.332 It must merely block access to the limited 
forum reasonably and without regard to viewpoint.333 The University 
is allowed to make hard decisions about its funding.334 As such, the 




 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had the chance to 
protect the separation of church and state in Badger Catholic v. Walsh, 
but instead misapplied the neutrality test and created further 
ambiguity. Perhaps because the court misunderstood the facts of the 
case or misinterpreted precedent, the University of Wisconsin is 
unnecessarily required to fund religious activity that it never aimed to. 
Rather than creating a more level playing field for participation by all 
student organizations, the court mishandled Badger Catholic v. Walsh 
and disregarded the high level of separation that the First Amendment 
demands. Moreover, by equating secular tasks with quintessential 
religious actions, the decision partakes in blanket assumptions about 
                                                 
330 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., dissenting); see Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 102 (Calabresi, 
J., concurring). 
331 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010). 
332 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998; see also Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 786–87 
(7th Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., dissenting).  
333 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 
(1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).  
334 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998; see also Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 
786–87 (7th Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., dissenting).  
335 See id. 
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religious activity. Rather than clarifying the discussion of religious 
funding in public education, the court’s decision merely adds to the 
serpentine wall of separation.  
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